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Foreword | Corruption in Australian sport 
is not a new phenomenon. A series of 
high-profile cases in Australia, combined 
with an increasing international focus, has 
seen a reassessment of Australian sport’s 
vulnerability to illegal activities such as 
match-fixing, use of inside information for 
betting purposes and the use of 
performance and image-enhancing drugs. 
This has led to the development and 
endorsement of national policies on 
match-fixing and doping, the 
establishment of sport integrity units, 
inclusion of specialist intelligence units in 
law enforcement and the creation of new 
match-fixing offences.
Yet the actual extent of corruption in 
Australian sport remains unclear. In 
particular, does it exist more in the form 
of a threat rather than an intrinsic or 
widespread problem? This paper 
examines some of the events that have 
affected the integrity of Australian sport 
between 2009–13 to describe the way in 
which corruption has manifested, the 
environment that has engendered the 
corrupt behaviour and the extent to 
which these incidents were primarily 
local events involving local actors. It also 
proposes situational crime prevention 
techniques that may assist in framing 
and responding to corruption in 
Australian sport.
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The association between corruption and sport has a long history (see Maennig 2005 for 
a review). Various commentators who have examined sport and crime have described 
numerous examples affecting a broad spectrum of sporting codes in which an unfair 
advantage has been deliberately sought or collusion has occurred to produce a favourable 
outcome (Boniface et al. 2012; Gorse & Chadwick 2011; Maennig 2005; Transparency 
International 2009). In recent decades, this behaviour has seemingly become more 
commonplace. Corruption in sport is now documented in numerous sporting codes—from 
recognisable contenders (eg football (soccer), tennis, cricket, thoroughbred and greyhound 
racing, basketball and baseball) to less obvious targets, such as snooker and badminton. 
It involves a range of offenders who may work cooperatively and is not just confined to 
‘grassroots’ participants (ie players, coaches, referees and judges; Boniface et al. 2012) but 
extending to intermediaries (eg agents), club and federation officials, and organised criminal 
entities. Further, it affects the way sport is played, managed and promoted, including:
• how matches or races are contested;
• the measures taken to enhance (or lessen) individual or team performance;
• player transfers;
• management of clubs and sporting federations;
• election to governing bodies;
• the acquisition of sponsorship, media and marketing rights; and
• bids to host large sporting events (Bures 2008).
While Australian sport is not immune to corruption, any past discussion has largely 
focused on individual, highly publicised cases and the broader implications of these.
Using examples of substantiated and alleged cases of corruption in Australian sport that 
occurred during the five year period 2009–13, the aim of this paper is to examine the 
nature of these events, the environment in which the corrupt behaviour manifested and the 
extent to which these were primarily local events involving local actors. It also considers 
contemporary legislative, policy and related responses to corruption risks in Australian sport 
and uses these and other proposed measures to demonstrate the utility of situational crime 
prevention techniques in stemming future incidences of corruption.
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What is corruption in the 
context of sport?
The term corruption describes a suite of 
behaviours that habitually defies universal 
definitional capture and categorisation. The 
absence of a universally accepted definition 
is particularly evident in the context of sport. 
Corruption in sport is often confined to the 
act of match-fixing, defined by Maennig 
(2005: 189) as:
…the form of behaviour by athletes 
who refrain from achieving the levels of 
performance normally required in the 
sport in question to win the competition 
and instead intentionally permit others 
to win, or behaviour by sporting officials 
who consciously perform their allocated 
tasks in a manner in variance with the 
objectives and moral values of the 
relevant club, association, competitive 
sports in general and/or society at large.
An alternate definition proposed by Boniface 
et al. (2012: 6) establishes corruption within 
the business of betting:
…any manipulation or attempted 
manipulation of a result or aspect of a 
game with the aim of enrichment on the 
sports betting market.
There is differing opinion as to whether 
doping or the use of performance and 
image-enhancing drugs (PIEDs) constitutes 
corruption. Maennig (2005: 189, 217) 
acknowledges that doping and corruption 
(in the context of match-fixing) have similar 
causes but argues that the former should 
not be conceptually merged with the latter 
as the intended effects—to ‘superperform’ 
and ‘malperform’ respectively—are distinct. 
Gorse and Chadwick (2011), by contrast, 
do consider doping as a form of corruption. 
They define corruption in sport as:
…any illegal, immoral or unethical 
activity that attempts to deliberately 
distort the result of a sporting contest 
for the personal material gain of one 
or more parties involved in that activity 
(Gorse & Chadwick 2010: np).
Four sub-categories of corrupt behaviour 
comprise Gorse and Chadwick’s classification 
of corruption:
• match-fixing (betting related); that is, 
where ‘results are manipulated to secure 
financial reward through betting operators 
for those involved’ (Gorse & Chadwick 
2011: 6)
• match-fixing (non-betting related) ie ‘those 
cases where results are fixed to ensure 
a match…over a rival or influencing the 
actions of officials to ensure victory for 
one party’ (Gorse & Chadwick 2011: 6);
• doping; and
• inside information, or the (mis)use of 
information to determine betting patterns.
Gorse and Chadwick (2011) used this 
scheme to estimate the prevalence of 
corruption in international sport. From their 
analysis of 2,089 proven cases of corruption 
from the period 2000–10, they determined 
that doping was overwhelmingly the most 
common form of corruption (95.6% of 
cases). Match-fixing comprised less than 
three percent of cases and the use of inside 
information around two percent of cases.
A topography of corruption in 
Australian sport
While a diversity of sports are played in 
Australia, the predominant codes are, in 
levels of participation and public interest– 
Australian Rules Football, rugby league, 
rugby union, soccer (or ‘football’), cricket, 
netball, swimming, tennis, motor sports, 
cycling and the ‘races’—thoroughbred, 
harness and greyhound racing. Almost all 
of the listed sporting codes have been the 
subject of controversy in the 2009–13 period 
considered here and most of these have 
been affected by allegations of corruption.
The following synopsis describes a select 
group of substantiated or (currently) alleged 
cases of corruption and otherwise unethical 
behaviour affecting Australian sport in the 
five year period from 1 January 2009 to 31 
December 2013. These do not represent the 
full range of cases, in volume or manifestation 
that occurred during this time period but were 
purposefully selected to:
• demonstrate some of the more serious 
cases of corruption affecting Australian 
sport;
• illustrate the spectrum of behaviours 
characterising these incidents and the 
sports they affected; and
• highlight where corruption could be 
described as entrenched in specific 
Australian sporting codes and industries.
The cases are categorised according to 
Gorse and Chadwick’s (2011) classification, 
with the qualification that not all cases are 
an exact fit and potentially encapsulate 
different facets of corruption—specifically 
match-fixing and doping.
Match-fixing (betting related)
Soccer
Victorian Premier League (Southern 
Stars FC)
The most prominent case of match-
fixing in Australia to date was reported in 
September 2013 and involved players and 
staff engaged with the Southern Stars FC, 
a football club in the second-tier Victorian 
Premier League. Sportradar, the internet 
betting integrity monitoring agent, detected 
irregular betting patterns associated with 
at least five Southern Stars games, which 
were characterised by ‘unusually poor 
play’ by some of the players (Six charged 
over soccer match-fixing scandal. The 
Australian, 16 September. http://www.
theaustralian.com.au/sport/football/six-
charged-over-soccer-match-fixing-scandal/
story-fn63e0vj-1226719864029; Crawford 
& Butler 2013).
Victoria Police subsequently charged six 
people with match-fixing offences, including 
the coach, four players (all of whom were from 
the United Kingdom) and a Malaysian national. 
The latter acted as liaison between the coach 
and players and a betting syndicate based 
in Hungary and Malaysia. The syndicate is 
reported to have made an estimated $2m on 
the five thrown games played between 21 
July and 13 September 2013 (Crawford & 
Butler 2013).
On 25 October 2013, the Football Federation 
of Australia (FFA) suspended the coach 
and four players for breaches of the FFA’s 
National Code of Conduct (Southern Stars 
players and coach banned by FFA following 
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criminal charges for alleged match-fixing. 
ABC News Online, 25 October. http://
www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-25/ffa-
bans-accused-match-fixers/5046854). 
The four players all subsequently pleaded 
guilty to three or four match-fixing charges 
and were convicted and fined between 
$1,200 and $3,000 each (Footballer rigged 
matches because of ‘slave-like existence’, 
court hears. The Guardian, 22 September; 
Portelli 2013). The coach was given a four 
month suspended custodial sentence and 
a fine of $3,000 (Cresswell 2014). Poor 
salaries were the motivating factor for the 
players’ involvement; the coach also cited 
he participated in the fix to ensure the club 
‘could pay their players’.
The Malaysian national pleaded guilty to one 
count of engaging in conduct that corrupts 
a betting outcome. In 2014, he received a 
custodial sentence of three years, with two 
years suspended (Baxendale 2014).
Rugby league
National Rugby League (Ryan Tandy 
and others)
Ryan Tandy, a player in the National Rugby 
League (NRL) team the Canterbury Bulldogs, 
was found guilty in October 2011 of 
‘dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage 
by deception’ through spot-fixing an 
August 2010 game between Canterbury 
and the North Queensland Cowboys. The 
fix referred to a play Tandy made early into 
the game with the intention of awarding a 
potential penalty to the Cowboys (Davies 
2011). The TAB detected a ‘betting plunge’ 
on the game where 95 percent of bets 
placed were on the first scoring play to be a 
penalty goal from the Cowboys. Tandy was 
fined $4,000 and placed on a 12 month 
good behaviour bond (Prichard 2012). He 
was later dismissed from the Bulldogs.
Harness racing
Australian harness racing (New South 
Wales)
In 2011, Harness Racing New South Wales 
commenced investigations into allegations 
by an insider of corruption in the NSW 
harness racing industry. The corruption 
centred on stewards receiving bribes from 
licensed individuals to not ‘swab’ (ie drug 
test) specified horses (Reilly & Roots 2011; 
Roots 2013a). The matter was referred to 
the NSW Police who laid charges against 
five men—two stewards, two trainers and a 
driver—using the state’s new match-fixing 
laws. All but one pleaded guilty to offences 
of either corruptly receiving or giving or 
offering a benefit.
In 2013, one of the stewards was given a 
custodial sentence of three years (with a 
non-parole period of 18 months) and the 
trainer a 30 month custodial sentence. 
The second trainer and the driver received 
community service orders. Harness Racing 
New South Wales has also sanctioned the 
accused with periods of disqualification and 
have charged up to eight additional persons 
under Australian Harness Racing Rules for 
their involvement (Roots 2013b).
Greyhound racing
NSW Greyhound racing industry
New allegations of systemic doping of 
greyhounds with substances including 
cocaine, EPO, amphetamines, caffeine, 
anabolic steroids and Viagra were raised 
in connection with the NSW Greyhound 
Racing Industry in 2012 and 2013 (O’Brien 
2012a; Rubinsztein-Dunlop 2013). The 
industry had already been the subject 
of previous inquiries, including a 2000 
investigation by the NSW Independent 
Commission Against Corruption, which 
found corrupt conduct related to swabbing 
irregularities against a chief steward and 
five other individuals (ICAC 2000).
The most recent allegations also referred to 
swabbing irregularities where swabs went 
missing or the results were not released 
until a considerable time after the race 
was held. It was alleged that the collusion 
involved not just stewards and trainers but 
also, according to a whistleblower on the 
veterinary advisory committee, veterinarians 
and laboratory staff who falsified test results 
(Rubinsztein-Dunlop 2013). There have 
also been claims of organised criminal 
involvement, notably by outlaw motorcycle 
gangs, who were engaged in the breeding 
and selling of dogs, and the deliberate fixing 
of races by putting in dogs who were known 
not to be good performers (O’Brien 2012b).
Match-fixing (non-betting 
related)
Australian Rules football
Australian Football League (Melbourne 
Football Club)
The Australia Football League’s (AFL) 
Integrity Unit investigated the Melbourne 
Demons in 2012 regarding allegations of 
deliberately losing games (ie ‘tanking’) in the 
2009 football season. The allegations first 
surfaced during an interview with an ex-
player (and supported by other personnel) 
that one of the officials eventually sanctioned 
by the AFL had suggested during a club 
meeting of the ‘perils of winning more 
than four games that year’ (Wilson 2013: 
np). It was suspected that tanking was 
proposed to promote the Demons chances 
of receiving priority in the following year’s 
draft pick (Wilson 2012). Clubs that win less 
than five games in a season are eligible for 
priority draft pick. The allegations emerged 
from statements made by club officials and 
players suggesting matches were being 
played in such a way to ensure a loss 
(Wilson 2012).
While the investigation concluded there was 
no evidence of any tanking having occurred 
or of management directing players to tank, 
the AFL found the coach and the general 
manager of football operations guilty of ‘acting 
in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the 
competition’ (AFL 2013a). Little context was 
given in the final report from the AFL as to 
what this act constituted but was presumed 
(by the media) to allude to the alleged 
statements made at the club meeting by 
the two officials investigated (Wilson 2013). 
Both were suspended and the club was 
fined $500,000. The club’s general manager 
was relieved of his duties as manager of club 
development in October 2013.
Doping
Australian Rules football and rugby 
league
Australian Football League and National 
Rugby League
In February 2013, the Australian Crime 
Commission (ACC) released the findings 
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of a 12 month co-investigation with the 
Australian Sports Anti-Doping Agency 
(ASADA) into the use of PIEDs by 
professional athletes in Australia and the 
involvement of serious and organised 
crime in its distribution. The focus of the 
investigation was ‘two major sporting 
codes in Australia’ (ACC 2013a: 5), later 
identified as the AFL and NRL (People 
speaking out about sports doping: Clare. 
ABC News Online, 10 February. http://
www.abc.net.au/news/2013-02-10/
people-speaking-out-about-sports-
doping/4510542), but the findings also 
included reference to intelligence gathered 
from other sporting codes. The investigation 
described ‘widespread use’ (ACC 2013a: 
7) of PIEDs, specifically peptides and 
hormones, among players. Most of these 
substances are prohibited under the S1 
or S2 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) 
Prohibited List and all but one listed 
under Schedule 7A or 8 of the Customs 
(Prohibited Imports) Regulations (Cth). 
The regime of administering the prohibited 
substances was, in some cases, identified 
as having occurred at the instigation 
or with the complicity of club officials, 
including coaches, sports scientists, high 
performance and other support staff. The 
use of peptides and hormones in a number 
of the identified clubs amounted to ‘team-
based doping’ and
…linked to a culture in some professional 
sports in Australia of administering 
untested and experimental substances 
to athletes in the hope they will provide 
an advantage (ACC 2013a: 8).
Australian Rules football
Australian Football League (Essendon 
Football Club)
One club that became the focus of 
attention around systemic doping regimes 
immediately following the release of the 
ACC/ASADA findings was the Essendon 
Football Club. A ‘sports science program’ 
that operated at the club in 2012 allegedly 
involved the frequent administration 
of undefined supplements, including 
a ‘supplement’ banned by WADA, to 
Essendon players (McKenzie & Baker 
2013a). The program was overseen by 
the club’s high-performance coach and a 
sports scientist hired by the club as part 
of the program. However, other officials—
notably the coach, assistant coach, 
football manager and club doctor—were 
also alleged to have been, at the very 
least, aware that supplements were being 
administered to players (Essendon Bombers 
out of 2013 AFL finals as James Hird 
accepts 12-month suspension. ABC News 
Online, 23 September. http://www.abc.net.
au/news/2013-08-27/essendon-bombers-
out-of-2013-afl-finals/4915888; Baker & 
McKenzie 2013a).
At the behest of the club, ASADA began an 
investigation of the program in early 2013; an 
interim report was delivered in August 2013. 
The club also commissioned an independent 
inquiry. The resultant report—the ‘Switkowski 
report’—was delivered in May 2013 and 
criticised the culture at the club, which 
allowed such a program to both develop 
and persist, despite concerns raised by 
several club officials (Switkowski 2013).
The AFL sanctioned three club officials 
for ‘conduct likely to bring the game into 
disrepute or prejudice the interests of the AFL’, 
with 12 and six month suspensions handed to 
the coach and football manager respectively 
and a $30,000 fine to the assistant coach 
(AFL 2013b:np). The Essendon Football Club 
was fined $2m (the largest fine recorded 
for any sporting club in Australia), deemed 
ineligible to play in the 2013 finals season and 
disqualified from first and second draft rounds 
for the 2013 and 2014 seasons.
In June 2014, ASADA issued 34 ‘show 
cause’ notices to 34 past and present 
Essendon players regarding their alleged 
use of a peptide banned by WADA, as part 
of the 2012 supplements scheme. The 
Essendon Football Club and its coach at the 
time of the scheme launched a subsequent 
federal court challenge regarding the 
lawfulness of the ASADA–AFL investigation 
into the club (Essendon mounts Federal 
Court challenge to doping notices issued 
to 34 past players. ABC Online, 14 June. 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-13/
essendon-chairman-paul-little-doping-
asada/5521714). In September 2014, the 
court ruled the investigation was lawful, 
with the reinstatement of amended show 
cause notices, contingent at time of writing 
on whether an appeal to the ruling would 
be initiated.
Use of inside information for 
betting purposes
Thoroughbred racing
Mr F, Mr A and NSW Police officers
The NSW Police Integrity Commission 
commenced an inquiry in 2013 into 
possible NSW Police involvement in the 
operation of sham gambling accounts with 
a known gambling identity Mr F. Mr F has 
been accused on a number of occasions 
of obtaining inside information to lay bets 
(McKenzie & Baker 2013b). Records 
obtained by BetFair suggested a collusive 
relationship between Mr F and a Victorian-
based jockey, who may have been providing 
information about races he was unlikely to 
win. This allegation was based on sizeable 
bets being placed on specific horses not to 
place (McKenzie & Baker 2013b).
The NSW Police Integrity Commission 
inquiry, which was ongoing at the time of 
writing, centred on the involvement of two 
NSW Police officers in the recruitment of 
up to 17 colleagues to act as fronts (or 
‘bowlers’) for betting activities undertaken 
by Mr F and another well-known high-
stakes gambler (Mr A). Both Mr F and 
Mr A are banned from using a number of 
large online betting agencies. Personal 
information from the 17 police officers was 
used to set up a series of betting accounts 
for Mr F and Mr A’s benefit; some of the 
personal information was given directly to 
the two (McClymont 2013).
It is worth noting here that many of the 
Australian cases used by Gorse and 
Chadwick (2011) in their examination of the 
prevalence of corruption in sport centred on 
the misuse of inside information by jockeys 
and AFL players to bet on races and 
matches respectively.
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Risks to Australian sport
A number of risk factors are identified as 
increasing the opportunity for corruption in 
sport. These include:
• the ‘closed environment’ in which athletes 
and sporting officials operate;
• differential responses to what is perceived 
as illegal;
• negligible pay and lack of financial 
security, particularly among second and 
lower-tier players and officials; and
• the link between sport and making 
money; crucially, the increased options 
available for betting and wagering (eg 
betting on defeats, specific plays) and 
the ascendancy of online gambling 
(Anderson 2011; Boniface et al. 2012; 
Forrest, McHale & McAuley 2008; Misra, 
Anderson & Saunders 2013).
In their discussion on preserving the 
integrity of Australian sport against crime 
and corruption, Misra et al. (2013: 141) also 
identified the ‘evolving sophistication of 
the betting market’ as a critical risk factor. 
In their list of risk factors, they additionally 
referred to the vulnerability of specific 
competitors and referees, the vulnerability 
of specific sports (such as those that are 
routinely heavily betted on, where the game 
is ‘episodic’ and can be manipulated by an 
individual competitor and those where the 
outcome is not of particular importance) and 
limitations in the structure and application of 
regulatory control.
Certainly these factors have played a role 
in influencing or facilitating a number of 
the cases described above. For example, 
the minimal salary offered by the Victorian 
Premier League was likely to be a motivating 
factor for participation in the alleged match-
fixing scheme involving the Southern Stars 
players and coach, and the combination 
of a tight network with a strong gambling 
culture provided the setting for the Tandy 
spot-fix. However, other environmental 
conditions are also arguably relevant.
One of the themes that emerged from the 
cases outlined above is the absence of 
clearly defined guidelines and practices 
to prevent and detect corruption (and see 
Anderson 2011). At the club or code level, 
codes of conduct and integrity oversight 
were underdeveloped or inconsistent and 
management structures disorganised. For 
example, the Switkowski (2013) report to 
the Essendon supplements case highlighted 
a lack of probity and due diligence in the 
selection and recruitment of club staff (in 
particular, contractors), poor administrative 
compliance (in this case, record keeping 
on the administration of supplements), 
inadequate internal controls and general 
failure to confirm whether instructions were 
acted upon. The ACC (2013a) also noted 
the risk attached to codes of conduct that 
do not cover all potential personnel attached 
to a sporting body, with contractors and 
consultants a notable omission, and the 
inconsistent application of integrity oversight 
across and within codes. Indeed, integrity 
oversight was assessed as particularly 
problematic due to the insular environment 
sport inhabits and the propensity to recruit 
and recycle from within the code.
Inconsistent responses to corruption in 
sport might also be considered a risk factor. 
Inconsistency might come in the form of 
inadequate monitoring and irregularity in the 
investigation of suspected corruption and 
standard application of minor sanctions. 
Maennig (2005) describes the net utility of 
corrupt behaviour as balanced between 
the utility of ‘successful’ corruption and of 
punishment, dependent on the probability of 
the act being detected. In Australia, oversight 
and the comprehensiveness of investigatory 
powers have been criticised and tellingly 
by persons in such roles. For example, the 
Integrity Auditor for the NSW Greyhound 
Racing Industry, David Landa, resigned 
from his position in 2012, claiming the 
oversight model for the industry was a ‘fraud 
on the public’, which left the designated 
authority with little or no independence 
and rudimentary powers to observe the 
functions of the role (O’Brien 2012a: np). 
Further, changes to the industry’s legal status 
resulted in it falling out of the purview of the 
NSW Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (Humphries 2013).
Victoria’s Racing Integrity Commissioner 
expressed a similar sentiment in the 
handing down of a 2013 inquiry report into 
race-fixing in the Victorian thoroughbred 
racing industry. Although concluding that 
race-fixing was not a ‘systemic issue’ in 
the state, Commissioner Perna significantly 
noted that the current investigative powers 
of the Racing Integrity Commissioner were 
‘inadequate to address current and emerging 
needs’ regarding race-fixing allegations in 
Victoria (ORIC 2013: 9). Current powers 
rendered the Commissioner:
unable to undertake investigations which 
compel the production of information 
or documents; require the appearance 
of persons; administer a sworn oath; 
or compel the answering of questions 
(ORIC 2013: 9).
Hence, the final report’s findings were based 
predominantly on information volunteered 
by respondents. 
Also of relevance is the current status 
of information-sharing arrangements 
between parties with a collective interest 
in stemming corruption in sport. In 2013, 
the Victorian Premier Dennis Napthine 
(also Victoria’s Racing Minister), Victoria 
Police Deputy Commissioner Graham 
Ashton and the then Chief Executive 
Officer of the ACC, John Lawler made 
specific calls to relax Commonwealth 
laws that restrict law enforcement from 
sharing information sourced from telephone 
intercepts with other concerned agencies 
(Baker & McKenzie 2013b; McKenzie & 
Baker 2013a). State and territory laws also 
limit what information can be disclosed to 
sport regulatory and integrity bodies by law 
enforcement. It was reported that these 
restrictions have prevented regulatory and 
integrity bodies from obtaining potentially 
critical information on race-fixing and doping 
allegations (Baker & McKenzie 2013b). In 
a move to improve these arrangements, 
the ACC signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding in November 2013 with the 
Victorian Racing Integrity Commissioner 
to facilitate collaboration and information-
sharing between the two agencies (ACC 
2013b), and is in consultation to implement 
the same with Western Australian and 
Tasmanian racing bodies (Australian 
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Crime Commission to collaborate on 
corruption with Victoria’s Racing Integrity 
Commissioner. ABC News Online, 13 
November. http://www.abc.net.au/
news/2013-11-13/australian-crime-
commission-to-collaborate-on-racing-
corruption/5089654)
Another relevant vulnerability is an apparent 
culture of corrupt behaviour that may be 
described as more identifiable with specific 
sporting codes. While recent inquiries 
into the Victorian and Western Australian 
thoroughbred racing industries did not 
confirm widespread corruption (ORIC 2013; 
but see We have evidence of corruption 
in racing: Police. SBS News Online, 26 
August. http://www.sbs.com.au/news/
article/2013/05/14/we-have-evidence-
corruption-racing-police), this industry, as 
well as the harness and greyhound racing 
industries, have historically been identified 
(at least anecdotally) as hotspots for corrupt 
activity. There are likely to be multiple reasons 
to account for this, notably that racing and 
wagering are ‘mutually interdependent’ 
operations and hence wide open to the 
temptation to manipulate results. Other 
factors, however, may be equally relevant 
and certainly featured in the alleged and 
substantiated cases affecting various state 
racing industries. These include:
• the use of an easily controlled competitor 
(ie indiscriminate doping of animals);
• easily manipulated processes (eg drugs 
testing and ‘swabbing’ balls);
• historically lax oversight; and
• strong, often familial interconnectedness, 
that promotes discussion and subsequent 
tolerance of unethical behaviour.
Protections in place
Sustained international focus on corruption 
in sport, combined with a reassessment 
of the risks to Australian sport has seen 
the introduction of a range of protections 
by both government and national sporting 
bodies. These comprise the:
• endorsement of national polices on 
match-fixing and sports doping;
• establishment of sport integrity units both 
at the national level and by individual 
sporting codes;
• inclusion of specialist intelligence units in 
law enforcement agencies; and
• creation of relevant criminal offences in 
state and territory legislation.
Match-fixing and sports doping 
policies
The National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport 
was endorsed by Australian sports ministers 
on 10 June 2011. Match-fixing is defined in 
the policy as:
…the manipulation of an outcome or 
contingency by competitors, teams, 
sports agents, support staff, referees 
and officials and venue staff…(Sports 
Ministers of Australia 2011a: 2)
and includes conduct comprising the
…deliberate fixing of the result, or of an 
occurrence of a result, or of a points 
spread; deliberate underperformance; 
withdrawal (tanking); deliberate 
misapplication of the rules of contest; 
interference with play or playing surfaces 
(by venue staff); and abuse of insider 
information to support a bet placed by 
any of the above or placed by a gambler 
who has recruited such people to 
manipulate an outcome or contingency 
(Sports Ministers of Australia 2011a: 2).
Among the aims of the policy is the 
promotion of information-sharing 
arrangements between Commonwealth 
and state/territory governments, law 
enforcement, sporting bodies and betting 
operators, and a consistency in methods of 
response and the development of sports-
based codes of conduct.
The National Anti-Doping Framework was 
updated and endorsed by sports ministers 
on 11 February 2011 (Sports Ministers of 
Australia 2011b). This framework is based 
on four principles that seek to promote 
cooperation between the Commonwealth 
and state/territory tiers of government, 
provide advocacy and education consistent 
with international policies, facilitate 
investigation and ensure the consistent 
imposition of sanctions as specified in the 
World-Anti Doping Code.
Sport integrity units
The Commonwealth Government established 
the National Integrity of Sport Unit (NISU) 
in 2012. The NISU has a broad range 
of coordination, monitoring, compliance 
auditing and advisory roles with respect to:
• anti-doping legislation and policy;
• the development of integrity strategies 
and frameworks to prevent and respond 
to doping and match-fixing, and
•  the promotion of information-sharing 
arrangements between relevant bodies.
It is also mandated to introduce 
whistleblowing instruments to facilitate 
disclosure of information on corrupt 
practices. An announced expansion of 
the NISU’s role saw the recruitment in 
2013 of specialist investigators from 
Commonwealth and state/territory law 
enforcement (Hooper 2013).
The NISU joins existing or similarly recently 
established Integrity Units in Australia’s 
major sporting codes (such as the AFL, 
NRL, Australian Rugby Union, Cricket 
Australia and Netball Australia); many 
developed in response to the findings of 
the ACC report or independent inquiries. 
The AFL’s Competition Integrity Department 
was established in 2008 and was the first 
such unit adopted by a sporting body in 
Australia. Its expansion following the ACC 
report has been accompanied by other 
measures including mandatory reporting 
of incidents of doping and whistleblowing 
policies (Walsh 2013).
Additional to these are codes of conduct or 
rules of engagement founded by sporting 
codes and articulated in private contracts 
between players and their club/sporting 
body. These establish standards of behaviour 
and the sanctions that may be applied where 
behaviour does not meet stipulated principles 
of conduct. Codes of conduct and contracts, 
in particular, have been used as a primary 
sanctioning mechanism for sports such as 
the AFL and NRL (see for example Bicknell 
2005; Davies 2011; Paterson 2009) and 
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arguably act as a first line of defence (and 
means of deterrence) against inducement to 
engage in corrupt behaviour.
Law enforcement
Just three specialist sports intelligence 
units exist in national, state and territory law 
enforcement. Victoria Police operates the 
sole specialist intelligence unit investigating 
sport and corruption. The Sporting Integrity 
Intelligence Unit was established in February 
2013 (Napthine 2013) and operates within 
Victoria Police’s State Intelligence Division. 
In New South Wales, the Casino and Racing 
Investigation Unit was formed as part of 
NSW Police’s Firearms and Organised 
Crime Squad to investigate race-fixing and 
links to organised crime in thoroughbred, 
harness and greyhound racing. The 
Australian Federal Police are also playing a 
more formal role in such investigations.
Match-fixing offences
Match-fixing offences have been created in 
New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, 
the Australian Capital Territory and the 
Northern Territory, with Tasmania planning 
to introduce similar legislation. These laws 
criminalise engaging, facilitating and/or 
concealing conduct that would corrupt 
a betting outcome on a sport or racing 
event and the use of corrupt conduct or 
inside information for betting purposes. 
Victorian legislation differs to other relevant 
jurisdictions by referring to the use of 
corrupt conduct but not inside information. 
The maximum penalty for these offences is 
10 years (7 years in the Northern Territory). 
The use of corrupt conduct or inside 
information incurs a maximum penalty of 
two years.
Intervention points for 
preventative action
Clearly embedded within international and 
national responses to stem corruption in 
sport is the crucial function of preventative 
action. For example, INTERPOL’s Integrity 
in Sport Program lists prevention, along 
with partnerships, information, coordination 
and proactivity (ie PICPP), as one of the five 
core principles in its approach to safeguard 
integrity in sport. Similarly, the International 
Centre for Sport Security (ICSS) promotes 
and works with clients to develop and 
establish corruption prevention tools. Much 
of this and other international employment 
of preventative strategies is described and 
delivered primarily in the form of awareness 
raising, education and training (of players, 
sports officials, management, governing and 
regulatory bodies, and law enforcement, 
as well as the broader community by, 
for example, the media), combined with 
improvements to the reach and impact of 
the regulatory environment.
In his outline on the menace of corruption 
in international sport, however, the Director 
of Sport Integrity at the ICSS raised the 
inadequacy of ‘proposed solutions [that] only 
address[ed] part of the problem’ as one of 
three factors that consolidated the resilience 
of corruption in international sport (Eaton 
2013: np). 
Table 1 Situational sport corruption prevention techniques
Technique Application
Increase the effort Target harden/control access Introduce multiple person oversight/sign-off on access to and release of match-relevant information (eg 
drug swab results)
Randomise assignment of stewards and other authorities officiating at races/games
Strengthen due diligence on identity information used to establish online betting accounts
Increase the risks Extend guardianship Establish or improve protocols for the recruitment and vetting of players, referees/umpires, club officials 
and contracted specialist staff/consultants
Improve partnerships between key stakeholders—sports bodies and regulators, betting operators and law 
enforcement/other public authorities
Initiate or strengthen information-sharing arrangements between key stakeholders and options to respond
Assist natural surveillance Establish avenues and protections for potential whistleblowers
Strengthen formal surveillance Establish club-level, sporting code and national sport integrity units to provide both oversight and scrutiny, 
and promote accountability
Establish a national entity to monitor wagering and sports betting
Reduce the rewards Remove target Strengthen contractual obligations that prevent players and officials from betting on own matches/races
Disrupt markets Limit the sums of money or number of bets that can be laid for a specific event/time period
Promote the use of regulated/monitored onshore betting operators and legal book- makers
Deny benefits Consistently apply penalties (in the form of suspensions, bans, club fines and/or criminal sanctions) for 
wrongdoing
Remove excuses Set rules Implement and extend codes of conduct and integrity guidelines to all personnel involved in the promotion, 
management and participation in professional sport
Include moral clauses and related, disciplinary rules in player, officials and management contracts
Alert conscience Disseminate awareness raising education and training to broad group of relevant stakeholders
Encourage media to monitor and demonstrate ‘greater transparency in coverage of sport corruption’
Note: Structure based on Table 15.1 in Ede, Homel & Prenzler 2002
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Specifically, these solutions did ‘not address 
core structural and jurisdictional weaknesses 
that allowed [corruption] to manifest’ (Eaton 
2013: np, emphasis added). While Eaton 
did not elaborate as to what these structural 
weaknesses comprised, it is possible to 
interpret and respond to this statement 
by applying situational crime prevention 
theory. A key part of such a response is to 
examine the environment that is conducive 
to sport-related corruption and identify 
the characteristics of that environment to 
determine where prevention actions could 
be applied to deny or reduce the opportunity 
for corrupt behaviour. Some of these 
environmental elements were described in 
the previous section on risk factors.
Situational crime prevention acts to prevent 
or reduce opportunities for crime from 
occurring through measures that make ‘crime 
more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and 
excusable’ (Clarke 1997: 4). Responding to 
corruption using situational crime prevention 
tenets has been explored, for example, in the 
context of police corruption (Ede, Homel & 
Prenzler 2002), environmental crime-related 
corruption (Graycar & Felson 2010) and 
public sector corruption (Rowe et al. 2013; 
Sidebottom 2010).
Crime scripts analysis is a practical and 
informative tool adopted in these studies 
to understand the ‘sequential steps and 
associated decision points’ (Sidebottom 
2010: 9) made by an offender(s) in the 
performance of a criminal event and on 
which preventative intervention can be 
applied. The number of corruption examples 
compiled for this study are, however, too 
few for such analysis and the level of detail 
(largely drawn from media reports and not 
chronologically detailed case studies) is 
not necessarily sufficient to properly map 
the sequence of events. Nonetheless, the 
themes described in the section on risks to 
Australian sport provide some context as 
to how these events transpired.
Listed in Table 1 are examples of current and 
potential approaches that may be used to 
adjust effort, risk, reward and excuse. Due to 
the context-specificity of corruption incidents, 
it was determined for the purposes of 
this paper that the techniques selected 
illustrate potential points of disruption 
applicable to one form of corruption ie 
match-fixing (betting-related; see Table 
1). Further examination of the application 
of situation crime prevention would ideally 
test-case individual sporting codes. This 
would not just allow the preparation of a 
more expansive inventory of situational 
crime prevention techniques but identify 
the broad applicability of these to different 
manifestations of sport-based corruption.
Note that while applications have been 
assigned to specific purposes, some of 
these are not mutually exclusive and may, 
for example, be equally relevant to more 
than one technique.
The techniques listed in Table 1 act to:
• constrain methods by which corruption is 
facilitated;
• increase the likelihood of detection;
• disabuse participants from gain through 
corrupt behaviour; and
• deter opportunity to ignore principles of 
behaviour and conduct.
These include measures that:
• contain ease of access to online betting 
accounts, presiding officials (eg stewards) 
and match-determining information;
• broaden and consolidate relationships 
between relevant entities to ensure 
responses are targeted and united;
• implement a formal layer of oversight and 
accountability in the form of integrity units;
• generate a protected method for reporting 
wrongdoing (eg whistleblower policies);
• limit the reward that can be obtained from 
betting activities for both sportspersons 
and punters;
• ensure wrongdoing is met with appropriate 
penalties; and
• establish and disseminate codes of 
conduct.
Some of the prevention actions listed 
in Table 1 have already been initiated or 
are being considered, although some 
may ultimately prove to be impractical 
(or meet industry resistance). While some 
are universally applicable (such as the 
establishment of integrity units), others are 
more pertinent to specific sporting codes 
(such as the randomised assignment 
of stewards and their access to result-
determining information).
A significant obstruction, however, 
in responding to corruption in sport 
is the ‘exponential growth’ of sports 
betting (Eaton 2013: np). Sports betting 
monitoring systems have progressed 
markedly since the early 2000s, typified 
by the Early Warning System adopted 
by FIFA and SportRadar, which monitors 
and analyses betting patterns, with 
the purpose of detecting irregular and 
suspicious activity (McCarthy 2013). The 
Early Warning System and SportRadar’s 
betting monitoring service are founded 
on contractual information-sharing 
arrangements and act in real time to allow 
for relatively rapid intervention.
While the impact of such services has clearly 
been a positive one in combating irregular 
and illegal betting activity, the displacement 
of wagering and betting to ‘the margins 
of the industry’, particularly with the 
advent of illegal or unregulated online and 
often offshore operations, creates further 
complexity for nations such as Australia. 
A report from the ICSS and the Sorbonne 
describes the issues connected to sports 
betting, including the huge increase in 
betting operators (some of which are located 
in tax havens), the aforementioned expansion 
of betting options and increased returns, the 
often inadequacy of regulatory response 
and the emergence of a new model of 
professional bettor who has adopted more 
sophisticated means of avoiding detection 
(University 1 Paris Panthéon Sorbonne & 
ICSS 2014). Responding to this requires 
‘huge resources’ (Misra, Anderson & 
Saunders 2013: 145) and potentially novel 
preventative approaches.
The utility of situational crime prevention is 
that it enables both flexibility and specificity 
in response. However, in advocating for 
such a response, the utility of multiple 
interventions targeting Australian sport need 
to be considered against the potentially 
considerable costs attached to maintaining 
such interventions. At present and despite 
predictions from established commentators 
that Australian sport will be consumed 
by corruption in the near future (Declan 
Hill warns Australian sporting bodies of 
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match-fixing threat. ABC News Online, 13 
May. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-
05-13/sporting-bodies-told-to-brace-for-
27tsunami-of-corruption27/5450660), the 
scale of corrupt activity is still unconfirmed. 
Warning signs from events occurring 
locally and overseas have justified the 
implementation of some of the more 
overarching measures (such as integrity 
units and codes of conduct) but the extent 
to which a fuller complement of measures 
is necessary requires a more finely tuned 
examination of the size and manifestation of 
the issue as it affects individual sports.
Conclusion
The examples of alleged or confirmed 
corruption described here as affecting 
Australian sport in the five years to 2013 
are too few to permit any form of rigorous 
analysis but these known incidents suggest 
that for the most part, corruption has been 
predominantly homegrown, involving local 
interests. Some of the cases, particularly 
in the racing industries, are typified by 
opportunities for collusion borne from 
community interconnectedness, processes 
that are open to misuse and compromised 
transparency. Others demonstrate the 
temptation that arises as sport and betting 
become progressively more intertwined, 
particularly given the increasing ease 
of placing wagers as a result of the 
introduction and uptake of online gambling, 
and the increasingly novel betting options 
being added to the wagering catalogue.
Most Australian sporting codes are deemed 
to be ‘relatively clean’ (We have evidence 
of corruption in racing: Police. SBS News 
Online, 26 August. http://www.sbs.com.
au/news/article/2013/05/14/we-have-
evidence-corruption-racing-police). It is 
accepted that there is clearly some risk, 
although the precise magnitude of this risk 
is unclear. It is also assumed that most 
sports in Australia are unlikely to be lucrative 
enough to generate organised international 
attention, although the majority of known 
match-fixing cases involving minor 
divisions in other parts of the world (and 
now here in Australia) may mean this 
contention is incorrect.
The extent to which corruption in 
Australian sport becomes a transnational 
phenomenon remains to be discovered. 
Law enforcement and sporting bodies 
have nominated match-fixing as the 
‘biggest risk’ to Australian sport and 
have warned of the inevitable infiltration 
of international syndicates into Australian 
sport and Australian-hosted sporting 
events (eg the 2015 Cricket World 
Cup) (Australian Crime Commission to 
collaborate on corruption with Victoria’s 
Racing Integrity Commissioner. ABC 
News Online, 13 November. http://www.
abc.net.au/news/2013-11-13/australian-
crime-commission-to-collaborate-
on-racing-corruption/5089654; Drill 
2013; ICC clampdown on corruption 
ahead of 2015. Aljazeera, 30 July. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/sport/
cricket/2013/07/20137307555676573.
html; Silvester 2013). That inevitability 
of infiltration may arise because of the 
opportunistic nature of sophisticated 
criminal entities or as illegal betting 
collectives see Australian sport as an 
increasingly viable venture. It may also 
arise if there is an assessment that the 
regulatory, integrity and law enforcement 
lens is not as sharply focused as it could 
be on local sporting codes.
Australia has countered corruption in sport 
with a suite of responses that provide a 
critical mix of accountability, validity and 
responsibility. As these measures are 
relatively new, a systematic evaluation 
of their effect in countering corruption 
has yet to be undertaken. The different 
manifestations of corruption affecting 
Australian sport and the underlying elements 
that fostered the corruption, however, may 
necessitate a degree of flexibility in the 
evolution of these interventions and future 
protective factors. This flexibility may come 
in the form of a broad-spectrum protective 
framework that can be used to select 
and combine techniques relevant to the 
sporting code in question and that deal 
with the target and method of corruption, 
define standards of engagement (regarding 
recruitment, conduct and use of betting 
operators), promote consistent application 
of penalties and encourage avenues for 
disclosure and information sharing. In 
further shaping such a framework, the 
cost of implementation must be weighed 
against ultimate necessity. This in itself will 
be dependent on further analysis of genuine 
versus perceived risk of corruption in 
Australian sport.
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